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LITIGATION, ARBITRATION, AND THE
TRANSNATIONAL SHADOW OF THE LAW
CHRISTOPHER A. WHYTOCK*
INTRODUCTION
That arbitration has replaced litigation as the leading method of
1
transnational dispute resolution has become a cliché. But like many
clichés, neither its empirical basis nor its broader implications are
entirely clear. From the perspective of actual or prospective
disputants, the choice between litigation and arbitration, while often
difficult, generally boils down to an analysis of a fairly standard set of
characteristics that distinguish these two dispute resolution
techniques.2 You cannot, for example, pick your judge, but you can
pick your arbitrator; litigation comes with preexisting rules of civil
procedure, whereas the parties can tailor their own rules for
governing the arbitral process; and in contrast to the transparency of
litigation, steps can be taken to keep arbitral proceedings
confidential. Arbitration also is potentially faster and less costly than
litigation.3 The implications of litigation versus arbitration are, in
other words, relatively clear from a disputant-oriented perspective.
As important as these considerations are for transnational
lawyering, this article instead provides a governance-oriented
perspective on transnational litigation and transnational arbitration.

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law. I thank Charles
Brower and Jim Holbrook for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
1. See, e.g., A. CLAIRE CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY:
TRANSNATIONAL MERCHANT LAW IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 225 (2003) (“[M]ost
trade experts would agree that private arbitration has eclipsed national adjudication as the
preferred method for resolving international commercial disputes.”); RICHARD GARNETT,
HENRY GABRIEL, JEFF WAINCYMER & JUDD EPSTEIN, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1 (2000) (“Arbitration is the dominant method
of resolving private party disputes in international commerce.”).
2. See, e.g., GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND FORUM SELECTION
AGREEMENTS: PLANNING, DRAFTING AND ENFORCING 5-15 (1999) (enumerating the
distinguishing characteristics of transnational arbitration and transnational litigation, and
proposing general guidelines for selecting the appropriate dispute resolution method).
3. Id. at 7-8; GARNETT ET AL., supra note 1, at 12-13.
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Governance-oriented analysis of transnational law has two central
4
features. First, it focuses on the implications of transnational law not
only for particular disputants, but also for the behavior of
transnational actors more generally.5 To help explore these
implications, I take Robert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser’s well
known “shadow of the law” metaphor—used by them to elucidate the
influence of divorce law and court decisions on the behavior of
6
divorcing couples “outside the courtroom” —and extend it to
transnational law and transnational activity. I will refer in this article
to the “transnational shadow of the law” to highlight the influence
that domestic law and domestic courts have on transnational activity,
including transnational arbitration.7 Second, the governance-oriented
approach involves not only doctrinal analysis of transnational law, but
also descriptive, causal, and normative analysis of transnational law in
action–including how judges actually decide cases.8
4. See Christopher A. Whytock, Domestic Courts and Global Governance, 101 AM. SOC’Y
INT’L L. PROC. 166, 167-68 (2007) (defining governance-oriented analysis and applying it to
forum non conveniens) [hereinafter Whytock I]; Christopher A. Whytock, Domestic Courts and
Global Governance: The Politics of Private International Law 257-59 (2007) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Duke University), available at http://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/handle/10161/452 (refining governance-oriented analysis and applying it to forum non conveniens and
international choice of law) [hereinafter Whytock II].
5. I use the term “transnational” to describe actors or activities with connections to more
than one state. Those connections can be territorial, when the activity or its effects touch the
territory of more than one state, or they can be based on legal relationships between a state and
the actors engaged in or affected by that activity, such as nationality or citizenship. In
international law and international relations theory, the term “international” technically refers
to interactions between unitary states. I use the term “transnational” to include nonstate actors
within the scope of this article. Following Jessup, I define “transnational law” as the body of law
“which regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers,” a concept meant to
embody both public and private international law and explicitly including domestic legal rules
that apply to transnational activity. PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 1-2, 70, 106
(1956).
6. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 950-51, 968 (1979); see also Martin Shapiro, Courts, in
HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE: GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES 321, 329
(Fred I. Greenstein & Nelson W. Polsby eds., 1975) (“[L]egalized bargaining [or negotiation]
under the shadow supervision of an available court . . . is not purely mediatory, because the
bargain struck will depend in part on the ‘legal’ strength of the parties, that is, predictions of
how each would fare in court.”).
7. See generally Whytock I, supra note 4, at 167; Whytock II, supra note 4, at 22-31; Cf.
Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Early Settlements in
GATT/WTO Disputes, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 158 (2000) (drawing attention to the shadow
cast by the World Trade Organization’s dispute settlement procedure on international trade
negotiations).
8. Whytock I, supra note 4, at 167-68; Whytock II, supra note 4, at 257; See generally

WHYTOCK_FMT2.DOC

2008]

10/15/2008 2:24:59 PM

TRANSNATIONAL SHADOW OF THE LAW

451

From a governance-oriented perspective, litigation and
arbitration are not only distinct methods of transnational dispute
resolution. They also provide foundations for two different forms of
global governance: transnational judicial governance and
9
transnational private governance. From this perspective, the
relationship between litigation and arbitration not only affects the
micro-level decisions of individual disputants regarding the dispute
resolution method that best advances their respective interests. It also
has implications for global governance, that is, for how and by whom
the rules of transnational activity are prescribed, applied, and
enforced.10
11
This article explores these implications in three parts. First, I
explain the concept of transnational judicial governance, describing
the role of domestic court decisionmaking in the regulation of
transnational activity. Next, I explain the concept of transnational
private governance, and argue that transnational arbitration is an
example of this form of governance. I then turn to the relationship
between litigation and transnational judicial governance on the one
hand, and arbitration and transnational private governance on the
other hand. I point to empirical evidence suggesting that the
conventional wisdom may overestimate the extent to which
transnational arbitration has replaced litigation. And I argue that
arbitration is only partially autonomous from transnational judicial
governance. Domestic courts perform a governance support function
for transnational arbitration,12 and except in narrow circumstances in
which private enforcement is possible on the basis of reputational
sanctions, transnational arbitration itself operates in the transnational
shadow of the law.
I conclude by drawing attention to the complexity of the
relationship between transnational judicial governance and
transnational arbitration. On the one hand, judicial monitoring of
Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 15 (1910) (“[I]f we look
closely, distinctions between law in the books and law in action, between the rules that purport
to govern the relations of man and man and those that in fact govern them, will appear, and it
will be found that today also the distinction between legal theory and judicial administration is
often a very real and a very deep one.”).
9. For a detailed definition and theoretical and empirical analyses of transnational judicial
governance, see Whytock II, supra note 4.
10. See ANNE METTE KJAER, GOVERNANCE 10 (2004).
11. The focus here is on U.S. courts.
12. Whytock I, supra note 4, at 167; Whytock II, supra note 4, at 28-29.
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transnational arbitration is minimal; on the other hand, arbitration
generally depends on domestic courts for enforcement. This raises a
variety of normative concerns, including whether transnational
arbitration can adequately respond to the negative externalities of
cross-border commercial activity.
I. TRANSNATIONAL JUDICIAL GOVERNANCE
From the perspective of an actual or prospective disputant,
litigation is one option among others for resolving transnational
disputes which carries with it particular advantages and disadvantages
for each of the disputants. From a governance-oriented perspective,
however, transnational litigation is the foundation of a form of global
governance, whereby judges make decisions that not only directly
affect the parties to particular disputes, but also indirectly regulate
the behavior of actors who engage in activity in the transnational
shadow of the law. I call this form of governance “transnational
judicial governance.”13
At the core of transnational judicial governance are two
allocative functions—one jurisdictional, the other substantive—that
domestic courts perform in the course of transnational litigation.
Jurisdictionally, domestic courts allocate governance authority over
transnational activity. As international relations scholar Miles Kahler
puts it, first and prior to all other questions about global governance
14
is “Who governs?” Domestic courts help answer this question. For
example, by making subject matter jurisdiction and forum non
conveniens decisions, they help allocate adjudicative authority among
states. And by making international choice-of-law decisions, they
allocate prescriptive authority. Domestic courts also help allocate
governance authority between public and private actors. For example,
they do so when they decide whether to enforce transnational
arbitration agreements and arbitral awards.15
13. I sketch my concept of transnational judicial governance only briefly here. For a more
comprehensive discussion, see Whytock II, supra note 4, ch. 1. See also Christopher A.
Whytock, Domestic Courts and Global Governance (Aug. 11, 2006), http://ssrn.com/author=386558.
14. Miles Kahler, Global Governance Redefined, (Oct. 2004), http://irpshome.ucsd.edu/faculty/mkahler/GlobGov_10.04.doc.
15. Of course, these allocative functions correspond to several important branches of
private international law. However, the governance-oriented approach emphasizes not only
what private international law doctrine says, but what the domestic courts applying it actually
do—that is, it focuses on how they actually allocate governance authority.
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In addition to the allocation of governance authority, domestic
courts perform a substantive allocative function: they allocate rights
and resources among transnational actors. It is well understood that
the allocation of rights and resources among litigants is a general
16
judicial function. However, it is only recently that scholars have
started to focus on the implications of this function for transnational
activity. For example, “transnational public law litigation” is litigation
in which “[p]rivate individuals, government officials, and nations sue
one another directly, and are sued directly, in a variety of judicial
fora, most prominently domestic courts,” based on rights derived
from both domestic and international law.17 When these cases result
in the award of compensatory or punitive damages, domestic courts
are allocating economic resources among state and nonstate actors.18
More fundamentally, these decisions implicate basic values of safety
19
and human dignity. In “transnational regulatory litigation,” domestic
courts apply explicitly regulatory domestic legal rules to transnational
activity, thus allocating rights and resources among the participating
actors.20 More broadly, as Hannah Buxbaum argues, these cases not
only close gaps in international regulation, but also “give domestic
courts a role in the transnational process of articulating and defending
global norms.”21 “Transnational private litigation” involves claims
based on private law, including the law of torts, property, and

16. See, e.g., Martin Shapiro, From Public Law to Public Policy, or the “Public” in “Public
Law,” 5 POL. SCI. & POL. 410, 413 (1972) (adopting the definition of politics as the authoritative
allocation of values, and arguing that judicial decisionmaking plays a central role in domestic
political processes precisely because law is an important instrument of value allocation).
17. Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L. J. 2347, 2348-49
(1991). In the United States, these suits are typically based on the Alien Tort Claims Act
(ATCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (providing that federal district courts have jurisdiction over any civil
action brought by an alien for a tort committed in violation of international law), as interpreted
by the Second Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals in Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d
Cir. 1980).
18. However, plaintiffs that are successful in transnational public law litigation against
states or state officials rarely are able to fully collect compensation. See id. at 2368 (“[N]o
Filartiga-type plaintiff has apparently collected full compensation for his injuries . . . .”).
19. These are among the values identified by Myres McDougal as being allocated by the
authoritative decisionmaking that constitutes international law. Myres S. McDougal, Some
Basic Theoretical Concepts about International Law: A Policy-Oriented Framework of Inquiry, 4
J. CONFLICT RESOL. 337, 343, 349 (1960).
20. Hannah L. Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 251
(2006).
21. Id. at 254.
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contracts.22 These fields of private law—although generally not
explicitly regulatory—are nevertheless policy instruments by which
23
states authoritatively allocate economic rights and resources. By
applying private law principles in transnational litigation, domestic
courts help implement these allocative policies transnationally. As
Robert Wai argues, the function of private law is “not simply
facilitation of transactions, but also compensation for harms and
24
social regulation of transnational conduct.”
Importantly, both the jurisdictional and substantive allocative
decisions made by domestic courts in transnational litigation have
shadow effects—that is, effects on the behavior of transnational
25
actors “outside the courtroom.” By publishing these decisions,
domestic courts provide information about how they are likely to
make similar decisions under similar circumstances in the future, thus
influencing the strategic behavior of transnational actors who acquire
this information.26 For example, decisions allocating adjudicative and
prescriptive authority affect transnational forum shopping by
litigants.27 They can also affect predictability regarding which state’s
rules apply to particular transnational activity, thus influencing levels
of compliance, and arguably influencing international regulatory
competition as well.28 Substantively, judicial allocation of rights and

22. Robert Wai, Transnational Private Litigation and Transnational Governance, in
CRITICIZING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 243, 243-61 (Markus Lederer & Philipp S. Müller eds.,
2005).
23. See Shapiro supra note 15, at 413 (arguing that private law is just as much an instrument
of authoritative value allocation as “public” or “regulatory”). See also Martin Shapiro, Public
Law and Judicial Politics, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE II 365, 366
(Ada W. Finifter ed., 1993) (The ‘private’ law of property and contract authoritatively allocates
most of the values in a capitalist society.”).
24. Robert Wai, Transnational Private Law and Private Ordering in a Contested Global
Society, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 471, 471 (2005).
25. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 6, at 951, 972-73 (discussing the shadow of the
law in the context of domestic divorce cases).
26. See Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas L. Brunell, Constructing a Supranational Constitution:
Dispute Resolution and Governance in the European Community, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63, 64
(1998) (“When a judge decides, the lawmaking effect of the decision is always twofold. First, in
settling the dispute at hand, the judge produces a legal act that is particular (it binds the two
disputants) and retrospective (it resolves an existing dispute). Second, in justifying the decision,
the judge signals that she will settle similar cases similarly in the future; this legal act is a general
and prospective one (it affects future and potential [disputants]).”).
27. See Whytock II, supra note 4, at 25-8.
28. Id.
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resources also has implications that extend beyond particular cases.29
Thus, domestic courts help define the shape, size, and content of
the transnational shadow of the law. Marc Galanter refers to “the
radiating effects of courts,” explaining that:
The contribution of courts to resolving disputes cannot be
equated with their resolution of those disputes that are fully
adjudicated. The principal contribution of courts to dispute
resolution is the provision of a background of norms and
procedures, against which negotiations and regulation in both
private and governmental settings takes place. This
contribution includes, but is not exhausted by, communication
to prospective litigants of what might transpire if one of them
sought a judicial resolution.30
The important point here is that these radiating effects extend beyond
borders.
II. ARBITRATION AS TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE
GOVERNANCE
Disputant-oriented analysis focuses on the advantages and
disadvantages of arbitration relative to litigation for particular
disputants involved in particular transnational interactions. From a
governance-oriented perspective, however, arbitration is not only an
alternative method of dispute resolution, but also an example of an
alternative form of global governance: transnational private
governance. “[T]ransnational private governance” is the governance
of transnational activity by nonstate or “private” actors. It involves
cooperation by nonstate actors “in order to establish rules and
standards of behaviour . . . . Non-state actors not only formulate
31
norms, but often also have a key role in their enforcement.” Thus,

29. For example, in transnational public law litigation, judges are not only resolving
particular disputes, but also “declaring (or not declaring) international norms that litigants
transport to other fora for use in political bargaining. Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public
Law Litigation, 100 YALE L. J. 2347, 2395 (1991). Similarly, transnational regulatory litigation
not only binds the litigants, but also can “enable national courts to participate in implementing
effective regulatory strategies for global markets.” Buxbaum, supra note 20, at 316. For its part,
transnational private litigation “might be able to introduce [new] policy values (sometimes
through new policy actors) into political negotiations or decision making in other venues,
domestic or international.” Wai, supra note 24, at 250.
30. Marc Galanter, The Radiating Effects of Courts, in EMPIRICAL THEORIES ABOUT
COURTS 117, 121 (Keith O. Boyum & Lynn Mater eds., 1983).
31. Andreas Nölke & Jean-Christophe Graz, Limits to the Legitimacy of Transnational
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transnational private governance “goes much further than traditional
lobbying in allowing private actors an active role in regulation
32
itself.”
In contrast to transnational judicial governance, where the
governors are public officials and the law of the forum state (or the
law of a foreign state to which the forum state’s choice-of-law
principles point) ordinarily provides the applicable rules, arbitration
can be understood as a form of private governance. The arbitrator is a
private individual who does not act as a government representative.
More fundamentally, the arbitral process is itself the result of private
agreement, the disputants generally being free to select the arbitrator
and applicable procedural and substantive rules. These rules may
33
include nonstate rules or customs.
Whereas legal scholars typically study arbitration from a
34
disputant-oriented perspective, political scientists are beginning to
examine it from a governance-oriented perspective. For example,
Alec Stone Sweet argues that the Lex Mercatoria—which he defines
as “the body of substantive law and dispute resolution rules and
procedures,” including arbitration, that govern transnational trading
relations35—is an increasingly important form of transnational private
governance:
Over the past four decades, the transnational business
community has successfully built a private system of
transnational governance: the new Lex Mercatoria. The actors
Private Governance 2, unpublished paper, available at http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/activitiesnews/conferences/conference2007/papers/Noelke.pdf.
32. Id.
33. BORN, supra note 2, at 2.
34. But see Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Ballad of Transborder Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 773, 773-74 (2002) (arguing that international commercial arbitration (ICA) “has had an
enormous impact upon . . . the structuring of a de facto international legal system, and the
development of a substantive world law of commerce. In a word, ICA has been a vital engine in
the creation of a transborder rule of law”); and YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH,
DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION
OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 3 (1996) (tracing the emergence of a global system of
private justice to “new kinds of ‘courts’—international commercial arbitration—and a special
body of ‘law’—the so-called lex mercatoria”).
35. Alec Stone Sweet, Islands of Transnational Governance, in ON LAW, POLITICS, AND
JUDICIALIZATION 323, 329-30 (Martin Shapiro & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2002) [hereinafter
Stone Sweet, Islands]; Alec Stone Sweet, The New Lex Mercatoria and Transnational
Governance, 13 J. EURO. PUB. POL’Y 627 (2006) [hereinafter Stone Sweet, Transnational
Governance]. See also MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS, AND
JUDICIALIZATION 292-95 (Martin Shapiro & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2002).
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who operate this system—firms, their lawyers, international
arbitrators, and legal academics—have evolved, and use, ‘anational’ principles of contract and a system of private ‘courts’
to organize and regulate cross-border commercial exchange.36
The main point is that arbitration is not only an alternative form of
dispute resolution, but also part of an alternative form of global
governance—transnational private governance.
III. ESCAPING THE TRANSNATIONAL SHADOW OF THE
LAW?
Taking a governance-oriented perspective, I have argued that
litigation and arbitration are not only alternative methods of
transnational dispute resolution, but also foundations for two
alternative forms of global governance: transnational judicial
governance and transnational private governance. This argument
raises fundamental questions: To what extent are transnational actors
using arbitration to circumvent state regulation of their activity? To
what extent, in other words, are they using arbitration to escape the
transnational shadow of the law? And what are the implications for
global governance? Are we witnessing the privatization of global
governance, a shift from transnational judicial governance (and other
forms of public governance) to transnational private governance?
I will venture no definitive answer here. Nevertheless, I will
attempt to make some modest progress by elucidating two related
issues that need more attention if we are to develop a sound
understanding of the relationship between litigation and transnational
judicial governance on the one hand, and arbitration and
transnational private governance on the other. First, how extensive is
the trend from litigation to arbitration in transnational dispute
resolution? Second, what is the relationship between domestic courts
and arbitration? To the extent arbitration depends on domestic courts
36. Stone Sweet, Transnational Governance, supra note 35, at 627. See also CUTLER, supra
note 1, at 183 (“The expansion of privatized dispute settlement through private, delocalized, and
transnationalized international commercial arbitration is [] part of a corporate strategy to
further disembed commercial law and practice from the “public” sphere and to reembed them
in the “private” sphere, free from democratic and social control. The devolution of authority to
resolve disputes and to enforce agreements to the private sphere through the increasing
legitimacy of private arbitration, and the reassertion of merchant autonomy as the substantive
norm, are perfecting this reconfiguration of political authority.”); SHAPIRO & STONE SWEET,
supra note 35, at 292 (“[T]he Lex Mercatoria is rapidly emerging as a relatively comprehensive
system of governance. . . .”); Stone Sweet, Islands, supra note 35, at 334.
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for its effectiveness as a system of transnational private governance,
the shift from litigation to arbitration might actually vindicate the
importance of transnational judicial governance—in particular its
governance support function—and suggest that it might not be so
easy after all for transnational actors to fully escape the transnational
shadow of the law.
A. Trends in Transnational Litigation and Transnational Arbitration
First, to what extent is arbitration replacing litigation as a
method of transnational dispute resolution? In disputes arising
between parties without preexisting relationships, arbitration is not
likely to replace arbitration. As Gary Born notes,
Almost all international arbitrations occur pursuant to
arbitration clauses contained in commercial contracts. It is, of
course, possible for parties to agree to submit an existing
dispute to arbitration, and this sometimes happens. . . .
Typically, however, it is difficult to negotiate a submission
agreement [or “compromis”] once a concrete dispute has arisen
and litigation tactics have been explored.37
For example, individual plaintiffs in transnational tort suits are
unlikely to have an ex ante arbitration agreement with the defendant,
and often will prefer the broad discovery rules and jury available with
litigation. Thus, litigation is likely to remain an important method for
resolving tort disputes arising from the negative externalities of
transnational activity.
Regarding transnational commerce, on the other hand, the
conventional wisdom is that arbitration has virtually replaced
38
litigation. Garnett et al. assert that “[a]rbitration is the dominant
method of resolving private party disputes in international
39
commerce.” According to Thomas Carbonneau, “[t]he status of
arbitration as the procedure of choice in transnational commerce can
40
no longer be seriously challenged.”

37. BORN, supra note 2, at 37.
38. See, e.g., CUTLER, supra note 1, at 225 (“[M]ost trade experts would agree that private
arbitration has eclipsed national adjudication as the preferred method for resolving
international commercial disputes.”); Walter Mattli, Private Justice in a Global Economy: From
Litigation to Arbitration, 55 INT’L ORG. 919, 920 (2001) (“Lawyers and judges agree that there is
now clear evidence of something of a world movement . . . towards international arbitration.”).
39. GARNETT ET AL., supra note 1, at 1.
40. Thomas Carbonneau, The Remaking of Arbitration: Design and Destiny, in LEX
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There is, however, an emerging contrarian view. Theodore
Eisenberg and Geoffrey Miller find that “large corporate actors do
not systematically embrace arbitration. International contracts
include arbitration clauses more than domestic contracts, but also at a
surprisingly low rate. . . . [C]orporate representatives believe that
litigation can add value over arbitration.”41 And as Thomas
Stipanowich concludes in a survey of empirical research on the
relationship between litigation and arbitration: “As for litigation, to
paraphrase Mark Twain, the rumors of its demise are greatly
exaggerated.”42
Unfortunately, little data is available for assessing these
divergent views.43 On the transnational judicial governance side of the
ledger, litigation continues to be alive and well, at least in the United
States. 253,273 civil cases were filed in the U.S. district courts in
2005,44 and an estimated 16.6 million were filed in U.S. state courts in
45
the same year. Moreover, overall civil litigation rates increased in
the last decade in both the federal46 and state47 judicial systems.
The problem is that litigation rates in general do not necessarily
reflect transnational litigation rates in particular. In fact, an empirical
study by Kevin Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg shows that the
MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION: A DISCUSSION OF THE NEW LAW MERCHANT 23 (Thomas
E. Carbonneau ed., revised vol. 1998).
41. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical
Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL
L. REV. 335, 373-74 (2007).
42. Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and the “Vanishing Trial”: The Growth and Impact of
“Alternative Dispute Resolution,” 1 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 843, 911 (2004).
43. See id. at 1 (noting that a “fundamental problem” faced by scholars studying the
relationship between litigation and various forms of alternative dispute resolution like
mediation and arbitration is the “paucity of useful, reliable information”). See also Eisenberg &
Miller, supra note 41, at 345 (“Little information exists about arbitration clause incidence in
sophisticated contracts . . . .”).
44. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS Table S-7 (2007),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2006/completejudicialbusiness.pdf.
45. National Center for State Courts, Examining the Work of State Courts: A National
Perspective
from
the
Court
Statistics
Project
27
(2006),
available
at
http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/csp/2006_files/EWSC-2007WholeDocument.pdf.
46. In 1995, 248,335 civil cases were filed in U.S. federal district courts; in 2005, 253, 273
were filed. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, supra note 44, at Table
4.4.
47. Civil litigation in state courts increased by fifteen and five percent between 1996 and
2005 for limited jurisdiction and unified/general jurisdiction courts, respectively. National
Center for State Courts, supra note 45, at 12.
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rate of one type of transnational litigation—alienage jurisdiction
cases—is declining. Using data collected by the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts, they show that the number of alienage
cases—that is, cases over which the U.S. district courts have
jurisdiction because the dispute is between “citizens of a [U.S.] State
and citizens or subjects of a foreign state”48—has substantially
declined since 1986.49 Might it be that this decline is due to a shift
50
from litigation to arbitration?
But this is only a small piece of the transnational litigation
picture. Clermont and Eisenberg exclude from their analysis cases
51
involving foreign nations. Moreover, aside from the information on
alienage cases, the Administrative Office data does not distinguish
transnational litigation from purely domestic litigation. Consequently,
the Clermont and Eisenberg study does not identify transnational
litigation in U.S. federal district courts on jurisdictional grounds other
than alienage, such as diversity cases between two U.S. citizens
involving activity with a transnational dimension, and federal

48. 28 U.S.C. §1332 (1940).
49. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia or Xenophobia in U.S.
Courts? Before and After 9/11, 4 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 441, 461 tbl.3 (2007) [hereinafter
Clermont & Eisenberg II]. As the authors explain in an earlier article, one reason for this drop
has to do with a legal change rather than litigation rates: in 1988, 28 U.S.C. §1332 was amended
to classify permanent resident aliens as U.S. state citizens rather than foreign citizens. Kevin M.
Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1120,
1124 n.15 (1996) [hereinafter Clermont & Eisenberg I].
50. A simultaneous decline in transnational litigation rates and rise in transnational
arbitration rates would at least circumstantially support the proposition that there has been a
shift from public to private forms of global governance. However, such evidence would not be
conclusive. It also would be necessary to demonstrate a relationship between these trends. Even
with perfect data on transnational litigation and transnational arbitration rates over time, this
would be difficult because of the non-fungibility of litigation and arbitration. Some disputes are
unlikely to be arbitrated at all—take, for example, tort claims involving parties having no a
priori relationship and therefore no preexisting arbitration agreement. Changes in the rate of
this type of litigation would not imply changes in arbitration rates. Conversely, there may be
some disputes that would not be likely to be litigated even without the option of arbitration—
for example, disputes with insufficient value to justify the time or expense of litigation. Since
such disputes will not be litigated anyway, changes in the rates of arbitration of such disputes
would not imply changes in litigation rates. In addition, litigation and arbitration do not exhaust
the available alternatives for transnational dispute resolution. Shifts to (or away from)
negotiation or mediation may help explain changes in the rates of litigation and arbitration.
Most fundamentally, interpretation of the data is difficult due to the lack of measures of the
underlying causes of disputes: changes in litigation or arbitration rates may be due to overall
changes in the rate of disputing, not changes in the popularity of one dispute resolution method
or another.
51. Clermont & Eisenberg, II, supra note 49, at 452 n.39.
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question cases involving a non-U.S. party or otherwise involving
transnational activity.
Furthermore, though most litigation in the United States is filed
52
in state rather than federal courts, the Administrative Office data
does not include state court cases. This means that inferences based
on the Administrative Office data run the risk of grossly
underestimating the total volume of transnational litigation in U.S.
courts, and inaccurately describing overall transnational litigation
trends. For now, it is difficult to do more than speculate about
whether transnational litigation in general is characterized by the
same trends that characterize alienage cases in the U.S. federal
district courts.
As for transnational private governance, “systematic knowledge
of arbitration is thin”53 and available data on arbitration rates is
mixed. On the one hand, it seems undeniable that the popularity of
arbitration increased dramatically over the course of the last century.
As Stone Sweet notes:
The number of arbitral centers that handle transnational
business disputes has grown at an astounding pace. In 1910,
there were ten arbitration houses; there were over 100 by 1985;
and today there are more than 150. . . . At the [International
Chamber of Commerce], the oldest, biggest, and most
important such institution, traders filed some 3,000 disputes for
arbitration during the 1920 to 1980 period, more than 3,500
during the 1990s, and 5,250 during the 1996 to 2005 period
(footnote omitted). By 2004, the annual number of filings
exceeded 550, and the annual number of awards rendered
exceeded 350.54
Stone Sweet estimates that seventy percent of the cases filed with the

52. See, e.g., ROBERT A. CARP, RONALD STIDHAM & KENNETH L. MANNING, JUDICIAL
PROCESS IN AMERICA 67 (7th ed. 2007) (“The lion’s share of the nation’s judicial business exists
at the state, not the national, level. The fact that judges adjudicate several hundred thousand
cases a year is impressive; the fact that state courts handle several million in a year is
overwhelming . . . .”). In 2005, 253,273 civil cases were filed in the U.S. district courts. Id. at 47.
53. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 41, at 348.
54. Stone Sweet, Transnational Governance, supra note 35, at 636 see also Carbonneau,
supra note 34, at 796 (noting that the American Arbitration Association’s International Center
for Dispute Resolution has administered more than 1,000 arbitration cases and has an annual
caseload approach 400); Mattli, supra note 38, at 920 (“The number of arbitration forums has
grown from a dozen or so in the 1970s to more than one hundred in the 1990s, and the caseload
of major arbitral institutions has more than doubled during the same period.”).
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ICC are “inter-regional” in the sense that the parties are based on
55
different continents, and states that “[t]oday, far more than 90
percent of all transnational commercial contracts contain an
arbitration clause.”56
On the other hand, a series of recent empirical studies indicates
that arbitration in general—and transnational arbitration in
particular—might not be as pervasive as some observers suggest. In
1997, Cornell University conducted a survey study on the use of
alternative dispute resolution by Fortune 1000 companies.57 Although
41.6 percent of respondents reported that they used arbitration
“occasionally” to resolve disputes, only 20.6 percent reported that
they used arbitration “very frequently” or “frequently,” and 37.7
58
percent reported that they did so “rarely” or “not at all.”
Another study, conducted by Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey
Miller, analyzed more than 2,800 contracts filed with the Securities
Exchange Commission in 2002, and found “[l]ittle evidence . . . to
support the proposition that [public companies] routinely regard
arbitration clauses as efficient or otherwise desirable contract
59
60
terms.” Only 11 percent of contracts contained arbitration clauses.
Twenty percent of international contracts—those involving a nonU.S. party—had arbitration clauses, which is higher than the overall
rate, but nevertheless in “contrast[] with predictions that arbitration is
the dispute resolution mechanism in international contractual settings,
and that the vast majority of international contracts provide for
binding arbitration.”61

55. Stone Sweet, Transnational Governance, supra note 35, at 636; see also BORN, supra
note 2, at 47 (noting that most of the ICC’s cases are international disputes).
56. Stone Sweet, Transnational Governance, supra note 35, at 635 (citing KLAUS PETER
BERGER, THE CREEPING CODIFICATION OF THE LEX MERCATORIA 111 (1999)); see also
Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 41, at 347 (citing a study finding that from 1993 to 1996, fifteen
of seventeen international joint venture agreements filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission included arbitration clauses, and another finding that more than eighty percent of
private international contracts have arbitration clauses).
57. See Stipanowich, supra note 42, at 880 tbl.19.
58. See id. (illustrating results of the survey of 600 respondents). Although most
respondents reported some use of alternatives to litigation, mediation—not arbitration—”was
far and away the preferred ADR process.” Id. at 881. However, the study does find that 31.9
percent of companies surveyed think that the presence of a non-U.S. party is a reason for
picking arbitration. See Stipanowich, supra note 42, at 883 tbl.23.
59. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 41, at 335.
60. Id. at 350-52.
61. Id.
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There are at least two possible explanations for the divergent
findings about arbitration. One is that perceptions about the
pervasiveness of arbitration may be driven at least in part by
assumptions that overstate or over-generalize the benefits of
arbitration relative to litigation, and therefore exaggerate the
attraction of arbitration for transnational actors.62 But a more
intriguing explanation for the divergent data on arbitration trends
might be that there is indeed an emerging arbitration-based system of
transnational private governance, but one in which U.S. parties do
not participate as widely as European parties. Given the historical
63
role of the United States in promoting transnational litigation, this
would be surprising indeed. Yet the studies cited by Stone Sweet,
which imply that arbitration is the norm in transnational dispute
resolution, are largely European studies. In contrast, the Cornell
University and Eisenberg and Miller studies, which suggest that
arbitration is not so widespread, are essentially U.S. studies: the
former is based on the practices of Fortune 1000 companies, which
are U.S. companies,64 and the latter is based on an analysis of

62. For example, arbitration is not necessarily faster and cheaper than litigation; it is
“seldom cheap” and “seldom speedy.” BORN, supra note 2, at 7-8. For these reasons, among
others, “there is growing dissatisfaction with arbitral adjudication.” Thomas E. Carbonneau,
Arbitral Justice: The Demise of Due Process in American Law, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1945, 1959
(1996). Moreover, arbitrators lack coercive powers over third parties to compel their
appearance as witnesses or as third-party defendants. And even if the absence of a right of
appeal is time-saving, it “means that a wildly eccentric, or simply wrong, arbitral decision cannot
be corrected.” BORN, supra note 2, at 7. Perhaps most importantly, most of the advantages of
arbitration are not generic to disputants; rather, the characteristics of arbitration are
advantageous or disadvantageous relative to those of litigation depending on the disputants’
respective strategic interests—which cannot be assumed to be in alignment. As one leading
expert on transnational litigation and arbitration puts it, “It would be imprudent to prescribe a
single dispute resolution mechanism for all transactions or parties. There are too many
variables, which counsel in different directions in different transactions for different parties.” Id.
at 5. Corporate lawyers know that “the decision to include an arbitration provision in a
commercial contract is complex and cannot be determined across the board.” Eisenberg &
Miller, supra note 41, at 350; see also Carbonneau, supra note 34, at 1959 (“Unless the structure
of arbitration is radically altered, it is not a suitable adjudicatory mechanism for every type of
claim. One of the presumably lasting lessons of the alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
movement is precisely that there is no universal device for dispute resolution.”).
63. See, e.g., Carbonneau, supra note 34, at 782 (“[W]hen Wall Street lawyers finally
accepted the primacy of arbitration in transborder commercial litigation, an even greater
volume of international commercial litigation migrated from domestic courts to transborder
arbitral tribunals.”); Mattli, supra note 38, at 921 (“In the United States, for example, the legal
counsels of major corporations have spearheaded the recent trend away from . . . court
proceedings toward . . . ADR.”).
64. See Fortune 500 Directory: FAQ Definitions and Explanations, http://money.cnn.co-
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contracts filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.65
Data collected by Walter Mattli on the origin of parties in ICC
arbitration cases provides some additional support for the plausibility
of this conjecture: since 1974, approximately fifty to sixty percent of
the parties involved in ICC arbitration were from Western Europe,
whereas only approximately ten to thirteen percent were from North
America.66
B. The Relationship between Litigation and Arbitration
Even if transnational arbitration has substantially replaced
transnational litigation, this would not necessarily imply a decline in
the importance of transnational judicial governance and an escape
from the transnational shadow of the law. Whether to draw these
conclusions would depend on the relationship between domestic
courts and transnational arbitration, particularly the extent to which
transnational arbitration as a system of private governance itself
depends on foundations provided by domestic courts.
The architects of the modern system of transnational arbitration
themselves recognized the foundational role of domestic courts, both
as facilitators and monitors of the system. As Thomas Carbonneau
puts it, “Sovereign state cooperation was indispensible to instituting
the process. [Transnational commercial arbitration] needed the
approbation of states to benefit from municipal courts’ status of
legitimacy and their authority in order to function effectively as a
67
transborder system.” In terms of facilitation, Articles II and III of
the New York Convention establish a general rule requiring domestic
courts to enforce arbitration agreements and arbitral awards. Articles
II and V provide mechanisms for judicial monitoring of the system
m/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2007/faq/ (“Included in the survey are U.S. incorporated
companies filing financial statements with a government agency. This includes private
companies and cooperatives that file a 10-K and mutual insurance companies that file with state
regulators. Excluded are private companies not filing with a government agency; companies
incorporated outside the U.S.; companies owned or controlled by other U.S. companies that file
with a government agency; and U.S. companies owned or controlled by foreign companies.”).
65. The Eisenberg and Miller study separately analyzes international contracts—those
involving at least one U.S. party. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 41, at 351 tbl. 3. But even
contracts between U.S. and non-U.S. parties are likely to be influenced by U.S. business
practices.
66. Mattli, supra note 38, at 940 tbl. 2. It is possible, however, that the higher participation
rate of Western European parties could reflect the Western European headquarters of the ICC
or a greater supply of disputes involving Western European parties.
67. Carbonneau, supra note 34, at 774-75.
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through limited review of arbitration agreements and awards. Under
Article II, a domestic court may review an agreement to arbitrate to
determine whether “the said agreement is null and void, inoperative
or incapable of being performed.” For its part, Article V permits a
domestic court to decline enforcement of an arbitral award if it
determines that “the subject matter of the difference is not capable of
settlement by arbitration under the law of that country” or “the
recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the
public policy of that country.”
Over time, however, transnational arbitration appears to have
68
acquired a considerable degree of autonomy from the state. Today,
“proponents of the Lex Mercatoria argue that state authorities have
largely ‘relinquished their authority to regulate’ transnational
contracting and arbitration, permitting both ‘to function
autonomously’ in what is, in effect, an ‘a-national’ way.”69
But what is the extent of this autonomy? According to what
Stone Sweet calls the “traditionalist” view, arbitration fundamentally
depends on states—particularly for enforcement.70 Carbonneau
argues that transnational arbitration depends critically on a uniform
law of arbitration “implemented by courts with the discipline of
consistency and predictability.”71 Similarly, W. Michael Reisman
argues that “[p]rivate international commercial arbitration depends,
for its effectiveness, on substantial and predictable governmental and
intergovernmental support. . . . There are many opportunities to
frustrate an arbitration. National courts are the critical defense line

68. See generally Stone Sweet, Transnational Governance, supra note 35. But see W.
MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION AND
ARBITRATION 139 (1992) (“International commercial arbitration is a form of private
international dispute resolution based on a network of public international agreements. It is
neither self-sustaining nor autonomous . . . .”)
69. Stone Sweet, Transnational Governance, supra note 35, at 637 (citing THOMAS
CARBONNEAU, LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION: A DISCUSSION OF THE NEW LAW
MERCHANT (1997)).
70. Stone Sweet, Transnational Governance, supra note 35, at 637 (“Traditionalists tend to
portray the Lex Mercatoria as a set of practices enabled by states. In their view, over time states
have granted, within realms constructed through treaty law and national statute, more rather
than less contractual autonomy to transnational economic actors, while retaining ultimate
regulatory authority over these practices.”).
71. Carbonneau, supra note 34, at 801-03. See also id. at 807 (“[A] laissez-faire state policy
in conjunction with universal contract law principles and the codification of basic regulatory
principles through international instruments constitute the legal foundation for the process of
ICA.”).
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against such efforts.”72 According to Robert Wai:
[I]nternational commercial arbitration still relies very much on
the support of national legal systems. The ultimate authority for
arbitration procedures is that they are recognized and
supported by national legislative and judicial processes.
Without the power of state legal systems behind them, a party
who expects to do poorly in the arbitration will have no
incentive to comply and may seek recourse to national legal
systems. Consequently, international commercial arbitration
operates very much ‘in the shadow of the law,’ and national
laws continue to impose important limits.73
Indeed, it is hard to imagine that U.S. withdrawal from the New York
Convention or, slightly less dramatically, a U.S. Supreme Court shift
toward broad interpretation of the Convention’s exceptions to the
general rule of judicial enforcement of arbitral awards, would not
significantly affect arbitration as a system of transnational private
governance.
In theory, however, enforcement might not have to depend
solely on state authority. As some scholars have noted, private
enforcement of arbitration agreements and arbitral awards may be
possible based on reputational sanctions.74 The logic is as follows: If
an actor’s reputation for keeping its commitments is good, that
reputation will increase the actor’s opportunities for entering
profitable transactions with other actors who are aware of that
reputation. If that reputation is bad, it will decrease those
opportunities. Therefore, an actor’s reputation for keeping its
commitments is a valuable asset. The actor has an incentive to keep
its commitments—including agreements to arbitrate and abide by
arbitral awards—because noncompliance will harm that reputation.75

72. REISMAN, supra note 68, at 107.
73. Robert Wai, Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown: The Regulatory Function
of Private International law in an Era of Globalization, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 209, 267
(2001-02).
74. Bruce L. Benson, An Exploration of the Impact of Modern Arbitration Statutes on the
Development of Arbitration in the United States, 11 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 479 (1995) [hereinafter
Benson I]; Bruce L. Benson, Arbitration in the Shadow of the Law, in NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW Vol. 1 93, 95 (1998) [hereinafter Benson II]; David
Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 373 (1990); Stone
Sweet, Islands, supra note 35, at 325.
75. See Charny, supra note 74, at 393 (“[L]oss of reputation among market participants” is
a type of nonlegal sanction, whereby “[t]he promisor develops a reputation for reliability among
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The problem is that reputational sanctions are likely to be
76
effective in only a narrow set of circumstances. For example, there
must be a mechanism for disseminating information about parties’
behavior—information is, after all, the link between behavior and
77
reputation. If A breaches an agreement to arbitrate with B, or
refuses to comply with the resulting arbitral award, B obviously has
knowledge of this, but absent such a mechanism, other actors do not
necessarily have this knowledge, leaving A’s general reputation
unharmed.78 One important value associated with arbitration—
confidentiality—makes it particularly challenging to satisfy the
information requirement. Confidentiality aside, as the size of a
community increases, it becomes increasingly difficult for any given
actor to keep track of the conduct and reputations of others. There
must also be a process for distinguishing valid and invalid reasons for
noncompliance with arbitration agreements and arbitral awards, for
only noncompliance which is understood by a community as
unjustified is likely to harm a party’s reputation.79 In addition, parties

market participants who are potential transactors. If the promisor improperly breaches his
commitments, he damages his reputation and thereby loses valuable opportunities for future
trade.”); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Institutional Equilibria and Equilibrium Institutions, in THE
SCIENCE OF POLITICS 51, 71 (Herbert F. Weisberg ed., 1986) (“A reputation for honest dealings
enhances one’s ability to enter into new cooperative ventures. . . . [I]f A reneges on his promise
[to B], the prospect of B ever doing business again with A declines precipitously. Indeed, if A
develops a reputation for reneging, then even those agents who have never been personally
victimized by A will not enter into coalitions with him.”).
76. See Christopher A. Whytock, Thinking Beyond the Domestic-International Divide:
Toward a Unified Concept of Public Law, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 155, 174-75 (2004).
77. See, e.g., Charny, supra note 74, at 418 (“One key to effective reputational controls is a
system for transmitting relevant information to market participants and for providing the
expertise necessary to evaluate that information.”); Shepsle, supra note 75, at 72 (noting that the
difficulty of indentifying cheaters reduces the effectiveness of reputational sanctions); Stone
Sweet, Islands, supra note 35, at 325 (“This solution, of course, depends entirely on the
organization of information and monitoring capacities, a collective good that, given the myriad
costs involved, may or may not be generated by the traders themselves.”). A modern solution to
this problem might be a web-based system for disseminating information, but it is difficult to
imagine how such a system could effectively operate in support of reputational sanctions
without foregoing confidentiality, which is one of the characteristics that make arbitration
attractive in the first place.
78. See Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L.
REV. 1823, 1862-63 (2002) (“The extent to which a violation is known by the relevant players
affects the reputational consequences of the violation. Obviously, if a violation takes place, but
no other state has knowledge of it, there is no reputational loss. The reputational consequences
will also be less if only a small number of countries know of the violation.”).
79. As Shepsle explains, “Cheating is not dichotomous (cheat, not cheat) and there are
many forms of opportunistic behavior. Legislator A, for example, pledges loyalty to his party,
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must have a time horizon that is sufficiently long for them to
incorporate the possibility of lost future business opportunities into
80
their decisionmaking.
All of this suggests that outside the shadow of the law,
transnational arbitration is likely to be an effective form of global
governance only in relatively small, well-defined, and enduring
communities, in which the parties have long time horizons and are
81
able to monitor each other closely. Elsewhere, transnational judicial
governance is likely to continue playing an important role, with
domestic courts performing a governance support function by making
themselves available for enforcement of arbitration agreements and
arbitral awards.
except on matters of conscience or constituency. But who is to determine when the exceptional
circumstance has arisen?” Shepsle, supra note 75, at 72. Similarly, noncompliance with an
agreement to arbitrate is not dichotomous: under the New York Convention, noncompliance is
not “cheating” if, for example, the agreement to arbitrate “is null and void, inoperative or
incapable of being performed” (Article II(3)), if the party lacked capacity to enter the
agreement (Article V(1)(a)), if the arbitral decision was on a matter beyond the scope of the
agreement (Article V(1)(c)), if the arbitral process was not in accordance with the agreement
(Article V(1)(d))—all of which may be matters of good faith disagreement in particular cases.
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
July 6, 1988, arts. II,V, available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/1958NYConvention.pdf.; See also
Charny, supra note 74, at 418 (“One key to effective reputational controls is a system for
transmitting relevant information to market participants and for providing the expertise
necessary to evaluate that information.”) (emphasis added); Guzman, supra note 78, at 1861-62
(noting that “minor violations have less reputational impact that major ones, good reasons for
the violation may reduce reputational harm of a violation, and lack of clarity regarding the
scope of an obligation reduces the reputational harm of violating it”).
80. See Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural
Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1659 (1996) (“The
problem of cooperation is solvable in many repeated games when players commit to an
enduring relationship, provided that they can observe each others’ moves and they do not
discount the future too heavily.”) (emphasis added).
81. See Benson II, supra note 74, at 97 (“In general, a close-knit community of transactors
can often offer private benefits and impose private sanctions that are sufficient to make
arbitration a jurisdictional choice, thereby avoiding the shadow of the law. In the total absence
of such a community . . . , arbitration may still survive if the state sanctions it as a procedural
option.”); Charny, supra note 74, at 418-19 (“Collective reputational enforcement should work
well in markets in which single, third-party decisionmakers wield nonlegal sanctions—that is, in
markets limited to a small, homogenous group of individuals who are in frequent contact and
thus can share relevant information. These markets are, of course, relatively rare. Conversely,
mass markets based on reputational bonds are feasible only with technology that conveys
information cheaply to a large group of transactors, such as computers used to monitor
creditworthiness or mass media used in advertising.”); Stone Sweet, Islands, supra note 35, at
325 (“Where contractants are not strangers, that is, where a pool of potential traders enjoys
ongoing, face-to-face relations with each other within a shared normative framework, collective
action problems and Prisoner’s Dilemmas are more easily overcome.”).
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Even if domestic courts facilitate transnational arbitration by
providing enforcement support, it is undeniable that domestic courts
have, to a substantial degree, emancipated the arbitration process
from judicial monitoring. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has
narrowly construed the grounds for non-enforcement of arbitration
agreements and arbitral awards, such as the public policy and nonarbitrability exceptions.82
But how closely does lower court practice conform to the
Supreme Court’s pro-arbitration policy? A recent study concludes
that in an increasing number of cases, lower courts are refusing to
enforce arbitration agreements by finding them unconscionable under
state contract law, at least in noncommercial cases.83 Does such a
trend exist in cases involving transnational arbitration? An
affirmative answer would suggest that the conventional wisdom may
underestimate the autonomy of transnational arbitration from judicial
monitoring, whereas a negative answer would support that wisdom.
By seeking an answer based on systematic empirical evidence,
scholars can improve their understanding of the relationship between
transnational judicial governance and transnational arbitration. As
Roscoe Pound put it, we need to understand not only law in books,
but also law in action.84
CONCLUSION
Governance-oriented analysis of transnational law focuses not
only on the implications of law for individual disputants in particular
cases, but also for transnational activity more generally. It focuses not
only on transnational legal rules, but also on how courts actually

82. See BORN, supra note 2, at 113 (“Most national courts have adopted narrow definitions
of ‘public policy’ and ‘non-arbitrability’ as bases for denying enforcement to foreign arbitral
awards.”); GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN
UNITED STATES COURTS 1111 (4th ed. 2007) (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506
(1974) and Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985))
(“During the 1980s, the [U.S.] Supreme Court brought the blossoming of the non-arbitrability
doctrine to a fairly decisive end.”).
83. Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Federal Preemption,
Contract Unconscionability, and Agreements to Arbitrate, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 469, 470-71
(2006) (objecting to the trend).
84. See Pound, supra note 8, at 15 (“If we look closely, distinctions between law in the
books and law in action, between the rules that purport to govern the relations of man and man
and those that in fact govern them, will appear, and it will be found that today also the
distinction between legal theory and judicial administration is often a very real and a very deep
one.”).
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apply those rules. It aims, in other words, to understand the
transnational shadow of the law and transnational law in action.
When one shifts from a disputant-oriented perspective to a
governance-oriented perspective, the relationship between
transnational litigation and transnational arbitration takes on new
significance. This relationship not only has implications for the microlevel decisions of individual disputants regarding the dispute
resolution method that best advances their respective interests. It also
has implications for global governance, that is, for how and by whom
the rules of transnational activity are prescribed, applied, and
enforced.
By focusing on the empirical and theoretical limitations of
various claims about the relationship between domestic courts and
transnational arbitration, this article surely has muddied rather than
cleared the water. But the analysis nevertheless leads to several
propositions that can serve as focal points for further research.
First, transnational arbitration is partially, but not completely,
autonomous from transnational judicial governance. On the one
hand, transnational arbitration has become increasingly autonomous
from judicial monitoring—although at least one recent study suggests
that the lower U.S. federal courts might not fully embrace the
85
Supreme Court’s laissez-faire attitude toward arbitration. On the
other hand, transnational litigation to an important extent still relies
86
on domestic courts for enforcement. This does not mean that
arbitration agreements and arbitral awards necessarily go unheeded
without judicial recourse. Rather, because of the strong proenforcement policy embodied by U.S. Supreme Court precedents,
transnational actors expect that domestic courts ordinarily will
enforce these agreements and awards, and are therefore more likely
to comply with them voluntarily.87
It is more by creating this knowledge than by providing
enforcement in particular cases that domestic courts support
arbitration as a system of transnational private governance. And it is
in this sense that not only disputants, but also the system of
transnational arbitration itself, operate in the transnational shadow of
85. See supra notes 83-84, and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 66-81, and accompanying text.
87. However, if transnational actors believe that lower courts are not as adamantly proarbitration as the U.S. Supreme Court, this knowledge may not be so certain, and one might
expect rates of compliance without judicial recourse to decline.
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domestic law.88 From a governance-oriented perspective, then, shifts
from litigation to arbitration may in fact vindicate transnational
judicial governance, by suggesting that even if it is not playing the
same direct transnational dispute resolution role that it once did, the
importance of its governance support function is increasing.
Second, it follows that transnational arbitration is probably
better characterized as a “mixed” rather than a purely private form of
89
governance. Governance involves the setting, application, and
enforcement of rules.90 Insofar as transnational arbitration involves
the application by a nonstate arbitrator of privately set rules (such as
lex mercatoria), and the private enforcement of the resulting arbitral
awards, it can be understood as a system of private governance. But
purely private forms of transnational arbitration are probably rare.
For one thing, in practice, private actors often select state law as the
governing law.91 The most fundamental challenge for a truly
autonomous system of private governance is, however, enforcement.
Private enforcement may be possible on the basis of reputational
sanctions, but only under particular circumstances which are not
likely to exist except within relatively small and enduring
communities.92 Therefore, as just discussed, transnational arbitration
generally continues to rely on domestic court enforcement, and to
that extent, it retains an important public dimension.

88. See REISMAN, supra note 68, at 9 (“[T]he assistance of national courts is necessary for
enforcement and . . . the expectation of the probability of that enforcement is a key factor in
‘voluntary’ compliance.’”); Wai, supra note 73, at 267 (noting the that transnational arbitration
relies very much on the support of domestic legal systems, and arguing that “international
commercial arbitration operates very much ‘in the shadow of the law.’”).
89. For that matter, transnational judicial governance also is a mixed public-private form of
governance. Although public officials (judges) apply the rules, the rules are typically state rules,
and enforcement (if necessary) is by the state, private litigants are ordinarily the ones that
initiate the transnational litigation process. See SHAPIRO AND STONE SWEET, supra note 35, at
293 (“litigants activate courts”).
90. See, e.g., KJAER, supra note 10, at 10 (defining governance as “the setting of rules, the
application of rules, and the enforcement of rules”).
91. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR.
J. INT’L L. 503, 519 (1995). One prominent practitioner advises against selecting “lex
mercatoria” as applicable law: “Except in unusual cases, these formulations should be resisted.
There is much academic debate, but little judicial authority, about what they mean, and there
are doubts about how widely they are enforceable (e.g., English courts in particular have
expressed reservations). Save where there is some powerful countervailing reason, business
enterprises should not expose themselves to the uncertainties or expenses that participation in
this scholastic debate could entail.” BORN, supra note 2, at 121.
92. See supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
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This suggests that beyond separate studies of litigation and
arbitration, future research should focus on the complex relationship
between these forms of transnational dispute resolution and the
global governance mechanisms—transnational judicial governance
and transnational private governance—that they support. At the
heart of the relationship is a paradox: arbitration both provides a
partial escape mechanism from, and substantially relies upon, the
transnational shadow of domestic law. A better understanding of this
relationship promises to shed light on broader questions about the
relationship between public and private authority in global
93
governance.
Third, from a governance-oriented normative perspective, it is
94
precisely this “odd relationship between the public and private” —
this combination of minimal judicial monitoring and strong judicial
support——that raises concerns.95 As A. Claire Cutler argues:
Curiously, national government officials are participating in the
expansion of the private sphere and the neutralization and
insulation of international commercial concerns from public
policy review. However, this insulation is incomplete, for state
authority over the enforcement of private settlements has been
strengthened as states undertake the binding commitment to
enforce foreign arbitral awards. State authority has thus been
curtailed in the settlement of substantive commercial legal
issues and disputes, but expanded in the enforcement of the

93. As Tim Büthe puts it, claims about the rise of private authority leave open a number of
important questions: “What is the role of the state in this empowerment of private actors? And
can states take back the authority thus granted to private actors? Does the increase in private
authority have a lasting effect on the role of states in international governance?” Tim Büthe,
Governance Through Private Authority: Non-State Actors in World Politics, 58 J. INT’L AFF. 281,
284 (2004).
94. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the “Haves” Come out Ahead in Alternative Judicial
Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 19, 31 (1999) (“[S]ome have
argued that the state has, in effect, privatized the dispute resolution system, providing an odd
relationship between the public and private dimensions of the legal system.”).
95. More generally, Cutler et al. argue that “we should be concerned about the increase in
private international authority on a number of counts. First, what does this mean for the
continued functioning and existence of the state itself? Second, who gets to participate in
making decisions given that corporations are not democracies? Third, are the rules the private
sector establishes fair and equitable, incorporating mechanisms for access and accountability?”
A. Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler & Tony Porter, The Contours and Significance of Private
Authority in International Affairs, in PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 333,
369 (A. Claire Cutler Virginia Haufler & Tony Porter eds., 1999).
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final awards.96
According to Cutler, “At the heart of these transformations is
the global mercatocracy, an elite association of public and private
organizations engaged in the unification and globalization of
transnational merchant law”97 seeking to “free [transnational
commercial activity] from democratic and social control,”98 in
99
furtherance of a “neoliberal” ideological agenda and representing
not a “globalization of legal culture” but rather a “globalization of
localized US commercial culture and practices.”100
While arguing that “[i]t is inaccurate and unfair to criticize
international arbitration as a ‘Northern’ mechanism that silences or
muffles the diversity of the world community,”101 Carbonneau agrees
that “[p]rivately funded, nonpublic, nonnormative alternatives are
simply not an adequate substitute for the public mission of the law.”102
For his part, Robert Wai argues that internationalist private law
reforms—including legal support for a shift from state-based litigation
to private arbitration103—have “increased the autonomy of
transnational business actors without an equivalent increase in
104
transnational regulation,” enabling “the transnational liftoff of
international business transactions from national regulatory

96. CUTLER, supra note 1, at 226.
97. Id. at 180-81.
98. Id. at 183.
99. Id. at 227. See also Nölke & Graz, supra note 31, at 18-19 (“[T]ransnational private
governance is not only supported by neoliberalism, but can also be viewed as its supporter, by
contributing to its stabilization. In other words, they are mutually reinforcing. . . . Neoliberalism
as an economic program is not equally benevolent to all parts of the business community. It
generally favours big, transnationally mobile companies, in particular capital investors. The
same can be stated for transnational private governance. One overriding concern . . . is that such
governance particularly favours large and well-established multinational companies, in
particular those from North America and the European Union (citation omitted).”).
100. CUTLER, supra note 1, at 235 (italics omitted). For other accounts of the rise of
transnational arbitration, see DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 34, and Wai, supra note 73.
101. Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Law-Making, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1183, 1196 (2004).
For an example of Carbonneau’s thoughts on improving the system of international arbitration,
see Carbonneau, supra note 34, at 818-24 (proposing a modestly enhanced form of judicial
review of arbitral awards).
102. Carbonneau, supra note 62, at 1962.
103. See Wai, supra note 73, at 220-22. Wai focuses principally on “the role of state actors—
in particular legislators and courts—in promoting or acquiescing in the ‘transnational liftoff’ of
arbitration and the use of non-state norms for resolving transnational civil and commercial
disputes.” See id. at 222.
104. Id. at 273.
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oversight.”105 According to Wai, the underlying “goals of commerce,
cooperation, and cosmopolitan fairness are important, but they can
exclude other worthwhile policy objectives such as distributive justice,
democratic political governance, or effective transnational
106
regulation.” Thus, at least one leading scholar of ADR argues that
“the time may be ripe—at both the transborder and domestic levels—
to refine the basis for the exercise of judicial supervision in
107
arbitration . . . .”
Underlying these particular concerns is a more general concern
about negative externalities: that private arbitration fails to address
the negative consequences that disputants’ transnational activity may
108
have on third parties. Thus, it might seem sensible for the presence
or absence of negative externalities to inform judicial review of
arbitral awards, perhaps in the context of the New York Convention’s
existing public policy exception to the enforcement of arbitral
awards.109 However, such an approach would be difficult to reconcile
with the Supreme Court’s very narrow reading of the Convention’s
exceptions to enforcement, and would likely be controversial in light
of the widespread understanding that the success of arbitration is
largely due to this narrow reading.110

105. Id. at 212.
106. Id. at 231.
107. Carbonneau, supra note 34, at 818. See generally id. at 821-22 (“A possible statutory
provision . . . might read: An international arbitral award can be denied recognition and/or
enforcement in the requested jurisdiction if the reviewing court determines . . . that the
arbitrators failed to follow or observe a material part or provision of the arbitration agreement
relating to choice-of-law, damages, or the agreement’s scope of application.”); Carbonneau,
supra note 101, at 1206-08 (proposing “a new form of public regulation of the arbitral process
and of arbitrators” focused on the professional skills of arbitrators).
108. Robert Cooter refers to the more general problem of spill-over: “In some
circumstances, state enforcement of social norms is unfair. Some norms that are good for one
community are bad for another community. For example, one community may develop a norm
that externalizes cost on another community, or one community may develop a norm that
inhibits competition from another community. Such a norm is unfair from the viewpoint of the
community harmed by it. The state cannot justify enforcing a norm that harms one community
on the grounds that it arose from a consensual process in another community.” Cooter, supra
note 80, at 1684.
109. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art.
V(2)(b), June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38. For example, the absence of negative externalities
might favor enforcement of arbitral awards, while their presence—unless adequately addressed
in the award—might favor non-enforcement.
110. Such a proposal would also raise difficult questions about how judges would determine
whether arbitral awards in particular cases address the problem of negative externalities.
Perhaps most problematic, because judicial review of arbitral awards is initiated by one or more
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Finally, what do we really know about transnational litigation
and transnational judicial governance, transnational arbitration and
transnational private governance, and the relationships between
them? This article suggests that we may know less than we think. But
it also suggests that it is important to learn more. Doing so will
require us to rely not only on anecdotes and intuition, but also
systematic empirical evidence. Using governance-oriented analysis,
we need to focus not only on transnational law in books—including
the domestic and international law of arbitration—but also
transnational law in action.
Mnookin and Kornhauser concluded their seminal article as
follows: “Theoretical and empirical research concerning how people
bargain in the shadow of law should provide us with a richer
understanding of how the legal system affects behavior, and should
allow a more realistic appraisal of the consequences of reform
proposals.”111 Likewise, research on how actors bargain in the
transnational shadow of domestic law—including bargaining over
arbitration itself—should improve our understanding of transnational
activity, including the role of both domestic courts and private
arbitrators in governing that activity.

of the private disputants themselves, it is likely that the number of awards actually reviewed
based on a “negative externalities” principle would represent only a small portion of the total
number of awards in cases involving negative externalities.
111. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 6, at 997.

